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Hoppmann aims at providing a “theoretical background for applied argumentative 
criticism” or, more in particular, at providing a “simplified taxonomy of critical 
questions” that can be used for the evaluation of real life argumentative texts. The 
main reason for undertaking such an endeavor, so he says, is the “undesirable 
widening gap” between the theory of critical questions and the critical praxis for 
which that theory has been designed. In order to develop a new taxonomy of critical 
questions that serves practical needs, Hoppmann first presents an overview of 
contemporary definitions of the concept. Second, he suggests a simplified taxonomy 
consisting of three types and gives some concrete examples of each of them. Third, 
he shows how the taxonomy may be of use in practice by analyzing a real life 
argumentative text. In my commentary, I will address some issues concerning the 
relation between the first and the second part of the paper and the broadness of 
Hoppmann’s understanding of the concept of ‘critical questions’. 
 
 
2. THE EXCLUSION OF SOME ACCOUNTS OF ‘OBJECTIONS’  
 
In the first part of the paper, Hoppmann reviews a number of contemporary 
definitions of the concept of ‘critical question’ and related concepts. Among the 
latter he counts the concept of ‘objection’. For the purpose of developing a simplified 
taxonomy of critical questions, so he announces, Hoppmann will only discuss 
definitions in which ‘objection’ designates “something roughly equivalent to ‘critical 
question’ (but in a different grammatical form)”. This means that, for instance, 
Walton’s “procedural objections” and Govier’s “objections against the circumstances 
of the arguer” are left out of the discussion. However, the taxonomy Hoppmann 
presents in the second part of the paper does seem to contain criticisms of the type 
just mentioned, namely under the heading of C.1 (general dialectical argumentation 
process level questions). So my first comment is: “What is the reason for excluding 
the accounts of ‘objections’ just mentioned from the discussion of the literature in 
the first part of the paper?” 
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3. THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL ACCOUNT OF CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
 
Another issue regarding the relation between the first and the second part of the 
paper arises from Hoppmann’s treatment of the pragma-dialectical account of 
critical questions. Within pragma-dialectics, as he correctly observes, the concept of 
critical questions is closely connected to the concept of argument schemes. 
However, all of the groups of critical questions that are part of the taxonomy 
presented in the second part of the paper can be related to pragma-dialectical 
concepts that are not discussed in the first part of the paper. The distinction 
between group A.1 (scheme-independent argument level questions) and group A.2 
(scheme-dependent argument level questions) relates to the pragma-dialectical 
distinction between criticisms raised against the propositional content of an 
argument and criticisms raised against its justificatory force (see for instance 
Hitchcock & Wagemans, 2011, pp. 193-197). The distinction between group B.1 
(presumption-sufficiency questions) and group B.2 (counterargument sufficiency 
questions) relates to the distinction between cumulative and complementary 
argumentation (see Snoeck Henkemans, 1997, pp. 71-99). Group C.1 (general 
dialectical process questions) does not only contain, as Hoppmann rightly remarks, 
questions concerning the arguer’s compliance with procedural rules like the ones 
listed in the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion, but also some 
questions concerning the fulfillment of higher-order conditions that in the pragma-
dialectical view are considered as necessary but non-sufficient conditions for 
resolving a difference of opinion on the merits (see Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 
2004, pp. 36-37; 189-190). Finally, group C.2 (setting dependent special process 
questions) contains questions related to the conventions that have to be taken into 
account in order to analyze and evaluate argumentative discourse in 
institutionalized contexts (see Van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 129-162). So my second 
comment is: “Why is the discussion of the pragma-dialectical literature in the first 
part of the paper restricted to the account of critical questions and to which other 
accounts of critical questions do the groups in the taxonomy – except group A.2 
(scheme-dependent argument level questions) – exactly relate?” 
 
4. THE BROADNESS OF THE CONCEPT OF ‘CRITICAL QUESTIONS’ 
 
A final issue concerns the broadness of the concept of ‘critical questions’. Hoppmann 
remarks that he is “aware that some people might prefer to restrict the label ‘critical 
questions’ to only one particular segment of argumentative criticism.” He indicates 
that the choice is an arbitrary one and that he wants to employ the label to 
“questions that test what is critical’. However, indicating that a choice is arbitrary 
does not exempt one from the dialectical obligation to defend the choice in view of 
the terminological status quo. Reflecting on the fact that the term ‘argumentative 
criticism’ is widely used as a generic term that covers various sorts of criticisms like 
‘critical questions,’ ‘objections,’ and ‘fallacies,’ my third and last comment is: “What 
is the reason for calling the taxonomy developed in the paper a ‘taxonomy of critical 
questions’ rather than a ‘taxonomy of argumentative criticisms’?” 
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